Kashmir Rejects the Gun, Pakistan Loses Its Alibi

Bharat Nanda

Pakistan’s claim that terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir represents an indigenous struggle is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. For decades, its establishment has invoked the Kashmiri people to justify a campaign whose consequences those very people have borne: killings, intimidation, disrupted livelihoods and generations raised under the shadow of violence. Now, the reported collapse in local terrorist recruitment strikes at the foundation of that argument. If young Kashmiris are refusing to join, Pakistan must explain whose struggle its armed proxies are continuing.

On November 18, Jammu and Kashmir Director General of Police Nalin Prabhat announced that Mohammad Lateef Bhat, killed in Kulgam, was the last remaining active local terrorist. Umar Nisar Dar had been killed in the same district two days earlier. The police chief said local recruitment had fallen to almost zero. For those of us examining national security from Jammu and Kashmir, this is a development of considerable strategic importance. It reflects the shrinking space available to an enterprise that has depended on recruiting local youth to give an externally sustained campaign a Kashmiri face.

The Defence Ministry’s recruitment figures reinforce that assessment: 146 local recruits in 2021, 121 in 2022, 19 in 2023, four in 2024 and one in 2025. These are official Indian figures. They indicate a sustained contraction across several years, rather than a temporary decline following a particular operation. Pakistan’s establishment can dispute India’s interpretation, but it cannot answer this trend simply by repeating the language of an indigenous uprising.

The significance extends beyond security statistics. Every young Kashmiri who stays away from a terrorist organisation denies that organisation a recruit, a local identity and access to a family and community. He also preserves his own future. The cumulative effect weakens the social foundations on which terrorist networks seek to operate.

This development deserves recognition as an achievement of sustained Indian counterterrorism efforts and the resilience of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Security personnel, intelligence agencies, police and civil institutions have worked under difficult conditions to reduce the space for recruitment. Families and communities have their own indispensable role. Pakistan’s narrative leaves little room for their agency because acknowledging their rejection of the gun would undermine its claim to speak on their behalf.

It would nevertheless be a mistake to confuse declining local recruitment with the disappearance of the threat. The remaining networks can infiltrate foreign terrorists, use local facilitators and organise attacks through small groups. A campaign can lose its recruitment base and still retain the capacity to murder civilians. India must therefore recognise the strategic gain while maintaining the operational pressure that made it possible.

The foreign component is central to this assessment. The Defence Ministry’s account records the killing of 12 Pakistanis attempting to cross the Line of Control in 2025. The Army chief stated that Pakistanis constituted 65 per cent of the 31 terrorists killed that year. Estimates of those still operating vary, but uncertainty over the exact number does not obscure the underlying issue. As local recruitment contracts, the role of cadres entering from across the border becomes harder to conceal.

For Pakistan, this creates a serious problem of explanation. An armed campaign increasingly dependent on foreign terrorists cannot acquire indigenous legitimacy through slogans or a carefully chosen organisational name. The nationality of the gunman, the location of his handler, the origin of his financing and the route by which he receives weapons all matter more than the vocabulary used to describe him.

Pahalgam exposed the devastating capacity of such networks. The April 22, 2025 attack killed 26 civilians and demonstrated how a small group could inflict an atrocity with national and regional consequences. It also brought renewed scrutiny to the organisations behind the violence.

The United States’ July 2025 designation of The Resistance Front was particularly significant. Washington identified TRF as a front and proxy for Lashkar-e-Taiba. That assessment directly challenged the usefulness of a locally styled identity as a means of concealing an established terrorist organisation. It placed the relationship within an American legal and sanctions framework, beyond the familiar exchange of accusations between New Delhi and Islamabad.

The United Nations monitoring team’s account added another important element. It recorded that TRF claimed responsibility for Pahalgam twice, published a photograph of the site and subsequently withdrew its claim. The report also recorded differing member-state assessments about Lashkar’s involvement. Its contents must be described accurately: a monitoring report recording submissions does not perform the function of a court. But the sequence of claims and retraction remains relevant, and Pakistan’s denials do not explain it away.

India’s National Investigation Agency subsequently filed a detailed chargesheet naming Pakistan-based handler Sajid Jatt, identifying the three attackers killed in Operation Mahadev as Pakistani nationals and charging two local facilitators alongside the LeT/TRF organisation. Those allegations belong before the court, where the evidence must be tested. They also set out a specific prosecutorial account of the relationship between handlers, attackers and support networks.

The American designation, the UN monitoring account and the NIA investigation carry different legal and evidentiary weight. Their overlapping references to TRF and Lashkar nevertheless make it increasingly difficult for Islamabad to portray the issue as an unsupported Indian accusation.

Pakistan’s response has remained familiar: denial of involvement, rejection of Indian findings and insistence that Lashkar is defunct. Its military spokesperson has also described attacks including Pahalgam as false flags. Such assertions require evidence. A state cannot demand that every allegation against it meet a rigorous standard while treating its own sweeping counterclaims as self-evident.

The claim that Lashkar is defunct deserves particular scrutiny. A ban has practical value when it disrupts an organisation’s leadership, financing, recruitment, training and ability to direct violence. Its existence on paper cannot substitute for an assessment of those capabilities. The relevant question is whether the network has been dismantled.

This is also why reports of terrorist infrastructure being rebuilt after India’s strikes in May 2025 matter. Indian intelligence accounts have alleged the restoration of launch pads and camps, including assistance for rebuilding Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Bahawalpur headquarters. Other reports describe a move towards smaller, dispersed facilities. Specific financial figures and allegations of direct state coordination should remain attributed where publicly available evidence does not settle them.

The strategic concern is clear. Infrastructure can adapt after an attack. Personnel can relocate, training can move and command arrangements can become less visible. A damaged headquarters may retain symbolic value while operational activity shifts elsewhere. India’s assessment must follow the network’s capacity to prepare and execute attacks, including its finances, communications and movement of cadres.

The proliferation of local-sounding names serves a related purpose. An unfamiliar label can delay attribution, suggest organisational independence and create uncertainty about responsibility. If established handlers and support structures continue beneath that label, the name becomes an instrument of concealment. This makes patient intelligence work and precise public attribution essential parts of India’s response.

National confidence requires evidentiary discipline. India’s case becomes stronger when each connection can withstand scrutiny. Exaggeration creates an opportunity for Pakistan to contest a peripheral assertion and avoid answering the more substantial record. A firm national position is best supported by facts presented with clarity and consistency.

From Jammu, the changing geography of violence is impossible to overlook. Rajouri, Poonch, Reasi, Udhampur and Kathua must occupy a central place in the national security assessment. The forested hills and difficult terrain can offer concealment to small groups, complicate pursuit and create opportunities for ambush. Communities in these areas face the consequences directly.

The ACLED assessment cited in the underlying analysis places more than 60 per cent of militant violence in the Jammu division in 2025, compared with about five per cent in 2018. That shift demands attention to local conditions, intelligence coverage and sustained security presence. The weakening of recruitment in the Valley must be assessed alongside the threat in Jammu, so that progress in one area does not obscure vulnerabilities elsewhere.

Attacks on civilians and pilgrims also have consequences beyond their immediate targets. They can damage livelihoods, spread fear and provoke communal hostility. Terrorist organisations benefit when a crime committed by a small network produces distrust between entire communities. India’s response must protect citizens, identify perpetrators and prevent those perpetrators from determining how Indians regard one another.

Pakistan’s military rhetoric adds to the contradiction in its position. Asim Munir’s assertion that Kashmir would one day become part of Pakistan, and the Corps Commanders’ Conference’s renewed description of Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, demonstrate the territory’s place in the establishment’s strategic outlook. These statements do not by themselves establish operational responsibility for a particular attack. They do make claims of detachment far less convincing.

Pakistan’s establishment seeks recognition as the principal external champion of Kashmir while resisting scrutiny of Pakistan-based organisations implicated in violence there. That position cannot command credibility indefinitely. Verifiable action against terrorist leadership, financing and infrastructure would carry greater weight than another categorical denial.

For India, the national objective remains the security, prosperity and full participation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The decline in recruitment provides an opportunity to consolidate progress through dependable governance, employment, education and responsive institutions. Legitimate grievances should receive serious attention because Indian citizens are entitled to be heard. Pakistan should never be allowed to appropriate those grievances as justification for terrorism.

At the same time, security preparedness must remain exacting. A small group can still cause immense loss. Infiltration routes, facilitators, financial channels and communication networks require sustained attention. India cannot permit a declining terrorist enterprise to restore its relevance through a spectacular attack.

Lateef Bhat’s death, according to the police assessment, closes the current roster of active local terrorists. The enduring achievement will be to keep recruitment near zero while dismantling the external networks seeking to reverse that trend.

The political meaning is already substantial. Pakistan has long claimed that the gun expresses the will of Kashmiris. The reported recruitment collapse weakens that claim at its source. Young Kashmiris are making choices that Islamabad cannot manufacture through a press conference or a proxy’s new name.

India must protect the space in which those choices are made. Pakistan must answer for the organisations operating from its territory. And the international community must judge both the claims and the conduct before it.

Jammu and Kashmir’s young people owe no service to Pakistan’s strategic ambitions. Their lives and futures belong to them. Every year in which they refuse the recruiter makes that reality clearer—and leaves Pakistan’s indigenous alibi with fewer Kashmiris to hide behind.

The author is geopolitical analyst, strategic thinker and author of “Beyond the Himalayas: Rediscovering India’s Forgotten Geography”. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at bharatnanda.author@gmail.com / x.com/@BharatNanda_